core/libxfont/CVE-2014-209-210-211.patch

From 2f5e57317339c526e6eaee1010b0e2ab8089c42e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 23:01:11 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 01/12] CVE-2014-0209: integer overflow of realloc() size in
 FontFileAddEntry()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

FontFileReadDirectory() opens a fonts.dir file, and reads over every
line in an fscanf loop.  For each successful entry read (font name,
file name) a call is made to FontFileAddFontFile().

FontFileAddFontFile() will add a font file entry (for the font name
and file) each time it’s called, by calling FontFileAddEntry().
FontFileAddEntry() will do the actual adding.  If the table it has
to add to is full, it will do a realloc, adding 100 more entries
to the table size without checking to see if that will overflow the
int used to store the size.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
 src/fontfile/fontdir.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/fontfile/fontdir.c b/src/fontfile/fontdir.c
index ef7ffa5..7271603 100644
--- a/src/fontfile/fontdir.c
+++ b/src/fontfile/fontdir.c
@@ -177,6 +177,11 @@ FontFileAddEntry(FontTablePtr table, FontEntryPtr prototype)
     if (table->sorted)
 	return (FontEntryPtr) 0;    /* "cannot" happen */
     if (table->used == table->size) {
+	if (table->size >= ((INT32_MAX / sizeof(FontEntryRec)) - 100))
+	    /* If we've read so many entries we're going to ask for 2gb
+	       or more of memory, something is so wrong with this font
+	       directory that we should just give up before we overflow. */
+	    return NULL;
 	newsize = table->size + 100;
 	entry = realloc(table->entries, newsize * sizeof(FontEntryRec));
 	if (!entry)
-- 
1.9.2


From 05c8020a49416dd8b7510cbba45ce4f3fc81a7dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 23:01:48 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 02/12] CVE-2014-0209: integer overflow of realloc() size in
 lexAlias()

lexAlias() reads from a file in a loop. It does this by starting with a
64 byte buffer.  If that size limit is hit, it does a realloc of the
buffer size << 1, basically doubling the needed length every time the
length limit is hit.

Eventually, this will shift out to 0 (for a length of ~4gig), and that
length will be passed on to realloc().  A length of 0 (with a valid
pointer) causes realloc to free the buffer on most POSIX platforms,
but the caller will still have a pointer to it, leading to use after
free issues.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
 src/fontfile/dirfile.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/fontfile/dirfile.c b/src/fontfile/dirfile.c
index cb28333..38ced75 100644
--- a/src/fontfile/dirfile.c
+++ b/src/fontfile/dirfile.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 
 static Bool AddFileNameAliases ( FontDirectoryPtr dir );
 static int ReadFontAlias ( char *directory, Bool isFile,
@@ -376,6 +377,9 @@ lexAlias(FILE *file, char **lexToken)
 	    int         nsize;
 	    char       *nbuf;
 
+	    if (tokenSize >= (INT_MAX >> 2))
+		/* Stop before we overflow */
+		return EALLOC;
 	    nsize = tokenSize ? (tokenSize << 1) : 64;
 	    nbuf = realloc(tokenBuf, nsize);
 	    if (!nbuf)
-- 
1.9.2


From 891e084b26837162b12f841060086a105edde86d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 23:02:00 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 03/12] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length in
 _fs_recv_conn_setup()

The connection setup reply from the font server can include a list
of alternate servers to contact if this font server stops working.

The reply specifies a total size of all the font server names, and
then provides a list of names. _fs_recv_conn_setup() allocated the
specified total size for copying the names to, but didn't check to
make sure it wasn't copying more data to that buffer than the size
it had allocated.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
 src/fc/fserve.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/fc/fserve.c b/src/fc/fserve.c
index 3585951..aa9acdb 100644
--- a/src/fc/fserve.c
+++ b/src/fc/fserve.c
@@ -2784,7 +2784,7 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn)
     int			ret = FSIO_ERROR;
     fsConnSetup		*setup;
     FSFpeAltPtr		alts;
-    int			i, alt_len;
+    unsigned int	i, alt_len;
     int			setup_len;
     char		*alt_save, *alt_names;
 
@@ -2811,8 +2811,9 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn)
 	}
 	if (setup->num_alternates)
 	{
+	    size_t alt_name_len = setup->alternate_len << 2;
 	    alts = malloc (setup->num_alternates * sizeof (FSFpeAltRec) +
-			   (setup->alternate_len << 2));
+			   alt_name_len);
 	    if (alts)
 	    {
 		alt_names = (char *) (setup + 1);
@@ -2821,10 +2822,25 @@ _fs_recv_conn_setup (FSFpePtr conn)
 		{
 		    alts[i].subset = alt_names[0];
 		    alt_len = alt_names[1];
+		    if (alt_len >= alt_name_len) {
+			/*
+			 * Length is longer than setup->alternate_len
+			 * told us to allocate room for, assume entire
+			 * alternate list is corrupted.
+			 */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+			fprintf (stderr,
+				 "invalid alt list (length %lx >= %lx)\n",
+				 (long) alt_len, (long) alt_name_len);
+#endif
+			free(alts);
+			return FSIO_ERROR;
+		    }
 		    alts[i].name = alt_save;
 		    memcpy (alt_save, alt_names + 2, alt_len);
 		    alt_save[alt_len] = '\0';
 		    alt_save += alt_len + 1;
+		    alt_name_len -= alt_len + 1;
 		    alt_names += _fs_pad_length (alt_len + 2);
 		}
 		conn->numAlts = setup->num_alternates;
-- 
1.9.2


From cbb64aef35960b2882be721f4b8fbaa0fb649d12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 23:02:12 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 04/12] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated lengths when reading replies
 from font server

Functions to handle replies to font server requests were casting replies
from the generic form to reply specific structs without first checking
that the reply was at least as long as the struct being cast to.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
 src/fc/fserve.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/fc/fserve.c b/src/fc/fserve.c
index aa9acdb..f08028f 100644
--- a/src/fc/fserve.c
+++ b/src/fc/fserve.c
@@ -91,6 +91,12 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
 			     (pci)->descent || \
 			     (pci)->characterWidth)
 
+/*
+ * SIZEOF(r) is in bytes, length fields in the protocol are in 32-bit words,
+ * so this converts for doing size comparisons.
+ */
+#define LENGTHOF(r)	(SIZEOF(r) >> 2)
+
 extern void ErrorF(const char *f, ...);
 
 static int fs_read_glyphs ( FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec );
@@ -206,9 +212,22 @@ _fs_add_rep_log (FSFpePtr conn, fsGenericReply *rep)
 		 rep->sequenceNumber,
 		 conn->reqbuffer[i].opcode);
 }
+
+#define _fs_reply_failed(rep, name, op) do {                            \
+    if (rep) {                                                          \
+        if (rep->type == FS_Error)                                      \
+            fprintf (stderr, "Error: %d Request: %s\n",                 \
+                     ((fsError *)rep)->request, #name);                 \
+        else                                                            \
+            fprintf (stderr, "Bad Length for %s Reply: %d %s %d\n",     \
+                     #name, rep->length, op, LENGTHOF(name));           \
+    }                                                                   \
+} while (0)
+
 #else
 #define _fs_add_req_log(conn,op)    ((conn)->current_seq++)
 #define _fs_add_rep_log(conn,rep)
+#define _fs_reply_failed(rep,name,op)
 #endif
 
 static Bool
@@ -682,13 +701,15 @@ fs_read_open_font(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     int			    ret;
 
     rep = (fsOpenBitmapFontReply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret);
-    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error)
+    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error ||
+	(rep->length != LENGTHOF(fsOpenBitmapFontReply)))
     {
 	if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK)
 	    return StillWorking;
 	if (rep)
 	    _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2);
 	fs_cleanup_bfont (bfont);
+	_fs_reply_failed (rep, fsOpenBitmapFontReply, "!=");
 	return BadFontName;
     }
 
@@ -824,13 +845,15 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     int			ret;
 
     rep = (fsQueryXInfoReply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret);
-    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error)
+    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error ||
+	(rep->length < LENGTHOF(fsQueryXInfoReply)))
     {
 	if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK)
 	    return StillWorking;
 	if (rep)
 	    _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2);
 	fs_cleanup_bfont (bfont);
+	_fs_reply_failed (rep, fsQueryXInfoReply, "<");
 	return BadFontName;
     }
 
@@ -951,13 +974,15 @@ fs_read_extent_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     FontInfoRec		    *fi = &bfont->pfont->info;
 
     rep = (fsQueryXExtents16Reply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret);
-    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error)
+    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error ||
+	(rep->length < LENGTHOF(fsQueryXExtents16Reply)))
     {
 	if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK)
 	    return StillWorking;
 	if (rep)
 	    _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2);
 	fs_cleanup_bfont (bfont);
+	_fs_reply_failed (rep, fsQueryXExtents16Reply, "<");
 	return BadFontName;
     }
 
@@ -1823,13 +1848,15 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     unsigned long	    minchar, maxchar;
 
     rep = (fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret);
-    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error)
+    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error ||
+	(rep->length < LENGTHOF(fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply)))
     {
 	if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK)
 	    return StillWorking;
 	if (rep)
 	    _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2);
 	err = AllocError;
+	_fs_reply_failed (rep, fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply, "<");
 	goto bail;
     }
 
@@ -2232,12 +2259,14 @@ fs_read_list(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     int			err;
 
     rep = (fsListFontsReply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret);
-    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error)
+    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error ||
+	(rep->length < LENGTHOF(fsListFontsReply)))
     {
 	if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK)
 	    return StillWorking;
 	if (rep)
 	    _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2);
+	_fs_reply_failed (rep, fsListFontsReply, "<");
 	return AllocError;
     }
     data = (char *) rep + SIZEOF (fsListFontsReply);
@@ -2356,12 +2385,15 @@ fs_read_list_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     _fs_free_props (&binfo->info);
 
     rep = (fsListFontsWithXInfoReply *) fs_get_reply (conn, &ret);
-    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error)
+    if (!rep || rep->type == FS_Error ||
+	((rep->nameLength != 0) &&
+	 (rep->length < LENGTHOF(fsListFontsWithXInfoReply))))
     {
 	if (ret == FSIO_BLOCK)
 	    return StillWorking;
 	binfo->status = FS_LFWI_FINISHED;
 	err = AllocError;
+	_fs_reply_failed (rep, fsListFontsWithXInfoReply, "<");
 	goto done;
     }
     /*
-- 
1.9.2


From 0f1a5d372c143f91a602bdf10c917d7eabaee09b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 23:02:25 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 05/12] CVE-2014-0211: Integer overflow in
 fs_get_reply/_fs_start_read

fs_get_reply() would take any reply size, multiply it by 4 and pass to
_fs_start_read.  If that size was bigger than the current reply buffer
size, _fs_start_read would add it to the existing buffer size plus the
buffer size increment constant and realloc the buffer to that result.

This math could overflow, causing the code to allocate a smaller
buffer than the amount it was about to read into that buffer from
the network.  It could also succeed, allowing the remote font server
to cause massive allocations in the X server, possibly using up all
the address space in a 32-bit X server, allowing the triggering of
other bugs in code that fails to handle malloc failure properly.

This patch protects against both problems, by disconnecting any
font server trying to feed us more than (the somewhat arbitrary)
64 mb in a single reply.

Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
 src/fc/fserve.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/fc/fserve.c b/src/fc/fserve.c
index f08028f..3abbacf 100644
--- a/src/fc/fserve.c
+++ b/src/fc/fserve.c
@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
  */
 #define LENGTHOF(r)	(SIZEOF(r) >> 2)
 
+/* Somewhat arbitrary limit on maximum reply size we'll try to read. */
+#define MAX_REPLY_LENGTH	((64 * 1024 * 1024) >> 2)
+
 extern void ErrorF(const char *f, ...);
 
 static int fs_read_glyphs ( FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec );
@@ -619,6 +622,21 @@ fs_get_reply (FSFpePtr conn, int *error)
 
     rep = (fsGenericReply *) buf;
 
+    /*
+     * Refuse to accept replies longer than a maximum reasonable length,
+     * before we pass to _fs_start_read, since it will try to resize the
+     * incoming connection buffer to this size.  Also avoids integer overflow
+     * on 32-bit systems.
+     */
+    if (rep->length > MAX_REPLY_LENGTH)
+    {
+	ErrorF("fserve: reply length %d > MAX_REPLY_LENGTH, disconnecting"
+	       " from font server\n", rep->length);
+	_fs_connection_died (conn);
+	*error = FSIO_ERROR;
+	return 0;
+    }
+
     ret = _fs_start_read (conn, rep->length << 2, &buf);
     if (ret != FSIO_READY)
     {
-- 
1.9.2


From 491291cabf78efdeec8f18b09e14726a9030cc8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 23:02:34 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 06/12] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in
 fs_read_query_info()

fs_read_query_info() parses a reply from the font server.  The reply
contains embedded length fields, none of which are validated.  This
can cause out of bound reads in either fs_read_query_info() or in
_fs_convert_props() which it calls to parse the fsPropInfo in the reply.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
 src/fc/fsconvert.c |  9 +++++++++
 src/fc/fserve.c    | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/fc/fsconvert.c b/src/fc/fsconvert.c
index 75b5372..dfa1317 100644
--- a/src/fc/fsconvert.c
+++ b/src/fc/fsconvert.c
@@ -118,6 +118,10 @@ _fs_convert_props(fsPropInfo *pi, fsPropOffset *po, pointer pd,
     for (i = 0; i < nprops; i++, dprop++, is_str++)
     {
 	memcpy(&local_off, off_adr, SIZEOF(fsPropOffset));
+	if ((local_off.name.position >= pi->data_len) ||
+		(local_off.name.length >
+		 (pi->data_len - local_off.name.position)))
+	    goto bail;
 	dprop->name = MakeAtom(&pdc[local_off.name.position],
 			       local_off.name.length, 1);
 	if (local_off.type != PropTypeString) {
@@ -125,10 +129,15 @@ _fs_convert_props(fsPropInfo *pi, fsPropOffset *po, pointer pd,
 	    dprop->value = local_off.value.position;
 	} else {
 	    *is_str = TRUE;
+	    if ((local_off.value.position >= pi->data_len) ||
+		(local_off.value.length >
+		 (pi->data_len - local_off.value.position)))
+		goto bail;
 	    dprop->value = (INT32) MakeAtom(&pdc[local_off.value.position],
 					    local_off.value.length, 1);
 	    if (dprop->value == BAD_RESOURCE)
 	    {
+	      bail:
 		free (pfi->props);
 		pfi->nprops = 0;
 		pfi->props = 0;
diff --git a/src/fc/fserve.c b/src/fc/fserve.c
index 3abbacf..ec5336e 100644
--- a/src/fc/fserve.c
+++ b/src/fc/fserve.c
@@ -854,6 +854,7 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     FSFpePtr		conn = (FSFpePtr) fpe->private;
     fsQueryXInfoReply	*rep;
     char		*buf;
+    long		bufleft; /* length of reply left to use */
     fsPropInfo		*pi;
     fsPropOffset	*po;
     pointer		pd;
@@ -885,6 +886,9 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     buf = (char *) rep;
     buf += SIZEOF(fsQueryXInfoReply);
 
+    bufleft = rep->length << 2;
+    bufleft -= SIZEOF(fsQueryXInfoReply);
+
     /* move the data over */
     fsUnpack_XFontInfoHeader(rep, pInfo);
 
@@ -892,17 +896,50 @@ fs_read_query_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     _fs_init_fontinfo(conn, pInfo);
 
     /* Compute offsets into the reply */
+    if (bufleft < SIZEOF(fsPropInfo))
+    {
+	ret = -1;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) < SIZEOF(fsPropInfo)\n",
+		bufleft);
+#endif
+	goto bail;
+    }
     pi = (fsPropInfo *) buf;
     buf += SIZEOF (fsPropInfo);
+    bufleft -= SIZEOF(fsPropInfo);
 
+    if ((bufleft / SIZEOF(fsPropOffset)) < pi->num_offsets)
+    {
+	ret = -1;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr,
+		"fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) / SIZEOF(fsPropOffset) < %d\n",
+		bufleft, pi->num_offsets);
+#endif
+	goto bail;
+    }
     po = (fsPropOffset *) buf;
     buf += pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF(fsPropOffset);
+    bufleft -= pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF(fsPropOffset);
 
+    if (bufleft < pi->data_len)
+    {
+	ret = -1;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr,
+		"fsQueryXInfo: bufleft (%ld) < data_len (%d)\n",
+		bufleft, pi->data_len);
+#endif
+	goto bail;
+    }
     pd = (pointer) buf;
     buf += pi->data_len;
+    bufleft -= pi->data_len;
 
     /* convert the properties and step over the reply */
     ret = _fs_convert_props(pi, po, pd, pInfo);
+  bail:
     _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2);
 
     if (ret == -1)
-- 
1.9.2


From c578408c1fd4db09e4e3173f8a9e65c81cc187c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 23:02:42 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 07/12] CVE-2014-0211: integer overflow in
 fs_read_extent_info()

fs_read_extent_info() parses a reply from the font server.
The reply contains a 32bit number of elements field which is used
to calculate a buffer length. There is an integer overflow in this
calculation which can lead to memory corruption.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
 src/fc/fserve.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/fc/fserve.c b/src/fc/fserve.c
index ec5336e..96abd0e 100644
--- a/src/fc/fserve.c
+++ b/src/fc/fserve.c
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from The Open Group.
 #include	"fservestr.h"
 #include	<X11/fonts/fontutil.h>
 #include	<errno.h>
+#include	<limits.h>
 
 #include	<time.h>
 #define Time_t time_t
@@ -1050,7 +1051,16 @@ fs_read_extent_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
 	numInfos *= 2;
 	haveInk = TRUE;
     }
-    ci = pCI = malloc(sizeof(CharInfoRec) * numInfos);
+    if (numInfos >= (INT_MAX / sizeof(CharInfoRec))) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr,
+		"fsQueryXExtents16: numInfos (%d) >= %ld\n",
+		numInfos, (INT_MAX / sizeof(CharInfoRec)));
+#endif
+	pCI = NULL;
+    }
+    else
+	pCI = malloc(sizeof(CharInfoRec) * numInfos);
 
     if (!pCI)
     {
-- 
1.9.2


From a42f707f8a62973f5e8bbcd08afb10a79e9cee33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 23:02:54 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 08/12] CVE-2014-0211: integer overflow in fs_alloc_glyphs()

fs_alloc_glyphs() is a malloc wrapper used by the font code.
It contains a classic integer overflow in the malloc() call,
which can cause memory corruption.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
 src/fc/fsconvert.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/fc/fsconvert.c b/src/fc/fsconvert.c
index dfa1317..18b0c0d 100644
--- a/src/fc/fsconvert.c
+++ b/src/fc/fsconvert.c
@@ -721,7 +721,12 @@ fs_alloc_glyphs (FontPtr pFont, int size)
     FSGlyphPtr	glyphs;
     FSFontPtr	fsfont = (FSFontPtr) pFont->fontPrivate;
 
-    glyphs = malloc (sizeof (FSGlyphRec) + size);
+    if (size < (INT_MAX - sizeof (FSGlyphRec)))
+	glyphs = malloc (sizeof (FSGlyphRec) + size);
+    else
+	glyphs = NULL;
+    if (glyphs == NULL)
+	return NULL;
     glyphs->next = fsfont->glyphs;
     fsfont->glyphs = glyphs;
     return (pointer) (glyphs + 1);
-- 
1.9.2


From a3f21421537620fc4e1f844a594a4bcd9f7e2bd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 23:03:05 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 09/12] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in
 fs_read_extent_info()

Looping over the extents in the reply could go past the end of the
reply buffer if the reply indicated more extents than could fit in
the specified reply length.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
 src/fc/fserve.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/fc/fserve.c b/src/fc/fserve.c
index 96abd0e..232e969 100644
--- a/src/fc/fserve.c
+++ b/src/fc/fserve.c
@@ -1059,6 +1059,16 @@ fs_read_extent_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
 #endif
 	pCI = NULL;
     }
+    else if (numExtents > ((rep->length - LENGTHOF(fsQueryXExtents16Reply))
+			    / LENGTHOF(fsXCharInfo))) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr,
+		"fsQueryXExtents16: numExtents (%d) > (%d - %d) / %d\n",
+		numExtents, rep->length,
+		LENGTHOF(fsQueryXExtents16Reply), LENGTHOF(fsXCharInfo));
+#endif
+	pCI = NULL;
+    }
     else
 	pCI = malloc(sizeof(CharInfoRec) * numInfos);
 
-- 
1.9.2


From 520683652564c2a4e42328ae23eef9bb63271565 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2014 23:03:24 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 10/12] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in
 fs_read_glyphs()

fs_read_glyphs() parses a reply from the font server.  The reply
contains embedded length fields, none of which are validated.
This can cause out of bound reads when looping over the glyph
bitmaps in the reply.

Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
---
 src/fc/fserve.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/fc/fserve.c b/src/fc/fserve.c
index 232e969..581bb1b 100644
--- a/src/fc/fserve.c
+++ b/src/fc/fserve.c
@@ -1907,6 +1907,7 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     FontInfoPtr		    pfi = &pfont->info;
     fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply  *rep;
     char		    *buf;
+    long		    bufleft; /* length of reply left to use */
     fsOffset32		    *ppbits;
     fsOffset32		    local_off;
     char		    *off_adr;
@@ -1938,9 +1939,33 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     buf = (char *) rep;
     buf += SIZEOF (fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply);
 
+    bufleft = rep->length << 2;
+    bufleft -= SIZEOF (fsQueryXBitmaps16Reply);
+
+    if ((bufleft / SIZEOF (fsOffset32)) < rep->num_chars)
+    {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr,
+		"fsQueryXBitmaps16: num_chars (%d) > bufleft (%ld) / %d\n",
+		rep->num_chars, bufleft, SIZEOF (fsOffset32));
+#endif
+	err = AllocError;
+	goto bail;
+    }
     ppbits = (fsOffset32 *) buf;
     buf += SIZEOF (fsOffset32) * (rep->num_chars);
+    bufleft -= SIZEOF (fsOffset32) * (rep->num_chars);
 
+    if (bufleft < rep->nbytes)
+    {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr,
+		"fsQueryXBitmaps16: nbytes (%d) > bufleft (%ld)\n",
+		rep->nbytes, bufleft);
+#endif
+	err = AllocError;
+	goto bail;
+    }
     pbitmaps = (pointer ) buf;
 
     if (blockrec->type == FS_LOAD_GLYPHS)
@@ -1998,7 +2023,9 @@ fs_read_glyphs(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
 	     */
 	    if (NONZEROMETRICS(&fsdata->encoding[minchar].metrics))
 	    {
-		if (local_off.length)
+		if (local_off.length &&
+		    (local_off.position < rep->nbytes) &&
+		    (local_off.length <= (rep->nbytes - local_off.position)))
 		{
 		    bits = allbits;
 		    allbits += local_off.length;
-- 
1.9.2


From 5fa73ac18474be3032ee7af9c6e29deab163ea39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 2 May 2014 19:24:17 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 11/12] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in
 fs_read_list()

fs_read_list() parses a reply from the font server.  The reply
contains a list of strings with embedded length fields, none of
which are validated. This can cause out of bound reads when looping
over the strings in the reply.

Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
---
 src/fc/fserve.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/fc/fserve.c b/src/fc/fserve.c
index 581bb1b..4dcdc04 100644
--- a/src/fc/fserve.c
+++ b/src/fc/fserve.c
@@ -2355,6 +2355,7 @@ fs_read_list(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     FSBlockedListPtr	blist = (FSBlockedListPtr) blockrec->data;
     fsListFontsReply	*rep;
     char		*data;
+    long		dataleft; /* length of reply left to use */
     int			length,
 			i,
 			ret;
@@ -2372,16 +2373,30 @@ fs_read_list(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
 	return AllocError;
     }
     data = (char *) rep + SIZEOF (fsListFontsReply);
+    dataleft = (rep->length << 2) - SIZEOF (fsListFontsReply);
 
     err = Successful;
     /* copy data into FontPathRecord */
     for (i = 0; i < rep->nFonts; i++)
     {
+	if (dataleft < 1)
+	    break;
 	length = *(unsigned char *)data++;
+	dataleft--; /* used length byte */
+	if (length > dataleft) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	    fprintf(stderr,
+		    "fsListFonts: name length (%d) > dataleft (%ld)\n",
+		    length, dataleft);
+#endif
+	    err = BadFontName;
+	    break;
+	}
 	err = AddFontNamesName(blist->names, data, length);
 	if (err != Successful)
 	    break;
 	data += length;
+	dataleft -= length;
     }
     _fs_done_read (conn, rep->length << 2);
     return err;
-- 
1.9.2


From d338f81df1e188eb16e1d6aeea7f4800f89c1218 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Date: Fri, 2 May 2014 19:24:17 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 12/12] CVE-2014-0210: unvalidated length fields in
 fs_read_list_info()

fs_read_list_info() parses a reply from the font server.  The reply
contains a number of additional data items with embedded length or
count fields, none of which are validated. This can cause out of
bound reads when looping over these items in the reply.

Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
---
 src/fc/fserve.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/fc/fserve.c b/src/fc/fserve.c
index 4dcdc04..c1cf9d6 100644
--- a/src/fc/fserve.c
+++ b/src/fc/fserve.c
@@ -2491,6 +2491,7 @@ fs_read_list_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     FSBlockedListInfoPtr	binfo = (FSBlockedListInfoPtr) blockrec->data;
     fsListFontsWithXInfoReply	*rep;
     char			*buf;
+    long			bufleft;
     FSFpePtr			conn = (FSFpePtr) fpe->private;
     fsPropInfo			*pi;
     fsPropOffset		*po;
@@ -2527,6 +2528,7 @@ fs_read_list_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
     }
 
     buf = (char *) rep + SIZEOF (fsListFontsWithXInfoReply);
+    bufleft = (rep->length << 2) - SIZEOF (fsListFontsWithXInfoReply);
 
     /*
      * The original FS implementation didn't match
@@ -2535,19 +2537,71 @@ fs_read_list_info(FontPathElementPtr fpe, FSBlockDataPtr blockrec)
      */
     if (conn->fsMajorVersion <= 1)
     {
+	if (rep->nameLength > bufleft) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	    fprintf(stderr,
+		    "fsListFontsWithXInfo: name length (%d) > bufleft (%ld)\n",
+		    (int) rep->nameLength, bufleft);
+#endif
+	    err = AllocError;
+	    goto done;
+	}
+	/* binfo->name is a 256 char array, rep->nameLength is a CARD8 */
 	memcpy (binfo->name, buf, rep->nameLength);
 	buf += _fs_pad_length (rep->nameLength);
+	bufleft -= _fs_pad_length (rep->nameLength);
     }
     pi = (fsPropInfo *) buf;
+    if (SIZEOF (fsPropInfo) > bufleft) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr,
+		"fsListFontsWithXInfo: PropInfo length (%d) > bufleft (%ld)\n",
+		(int) SIZEOF (fsPropInfo), bufleft);
+#endif
+	err = AllocError;
+	goto done;
+    }
+    bufleft -= SIZEOF (fsPropInfo);
     buf += SIZEOF (fsPropInfo);
     po = (fsPropOffset *) buf;
+    if (pi->num_offsets > (bufleft / SIZEOF (fsPropOffset))) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr,
+		"fsListFontsWithXInfo: offset length (%d * %d) > bufleft (%ld)\n",
+		pi->num_offsets, (int) SIZEOF (fsPropOffset), bufleft);
+#endif
+	err = AllocError;
+	goto done;
+    }
+    bufleft -= pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF (fsPropOffset);
     buf += pi->num_offsets * SIZEOF (fsPropOffset);
     pd = (pointer) buf;
+    if (pi->data_len > bufleft) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr,
+		"fsListFontsWithXInfo: data length (%d) > bufleft (%ld)\n",
+		pi->data_len, bufleft);
+#endif
+	err = AllocError;
+	goto done;
+    }
+    bufleft -= pi->data_len;
     buf += pi->data_len;
     if (conn->fsMajorVersion > 1)
     {
+	if (rep->nameLength > bufleft) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	    fprintf(stderr,
+		    "fsListFontsWithXInfo: name length (%d) > bufleft (%ld)\n",
+		    (int) rep->nameLength, bufleft);
+#endif
+	    err = AllocError;
+	    goto done;
+	}
+	/* binfo->name is a 256 char array, rep->nameLength is a CARD8 */
 	memcpy (binfo->name, buf, rep->nameLength);
 	buf += _fs_pad_length (rep->nameLength);
+	bufleft -= _fs_pad_length (rep->nameLength);
     }
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-- 
1.9.2