glfs/postlfs/security/firewalling.xml
Bruce Dubbs d8717e49ec Update to iptables-1.4.16.2.
Fix firewall scripts to be compatible with current iptables.


git-svn-id: svn://svn.linuxfromscratch.org/BLFS/trunk/BOOK@10735 af4574ff-66df-0310-9fd7-8a98e5e911e0
2012-10-16 17:13:00 +00:00

595 lines
25 KiB
XML

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE sect1 PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN"
"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd" [
<!ENTITY % general-entities SYSTEM "../../general.ent">
%general-entities;
]>
<sect1 id="fw-firewall" xreflabel="Firewalling">
<?dbhtml filename="firewall.html"?>
<sect1info>
<othername>$LastChangedBy$</othername>
<date>$Date$</date>
</sect1info>
<title>Setting Up a Network Firewall</title>
<para>Before you read this part of the chapter, you should have
already installed iptables as described in the previous section.</para>
<sect2 id="fw-intro" xreflabel="Firewalling Introduction">
<title>Introduction to Firewall Creation</title>
<para>The general purpose of a firewall is to protect a computer or
a network against malicious access.</para>
<para>In a perfect world, every daemon or service on every machine
is perfectly configured and immune to flaws such as buffer overflows
or other problems regarding its security. Furthermore, you trust
every user accessing your services. In this world, you do not need
to have a firewall.</para>
<para>In the real world however, daemons may be misconfigured and
exploits against essential services are freely available. You may
wish to choose which services are accessible by certain machines or
you may wish to limit which machines or applications are allowed
external access. Alternatively, you may simply not trust some of
your applications or users. You are probably connected to the
Internet. In this world, a firewall is essential.</para>
<para>Don't assume however, that having a firewall makes careful
configuration redundant, or that it makes any negligent
misconfiguration harmless. It doesn't prevent anyone from exploiting
a service you intentionally offer but haven't recently updated or
patched after an exploit went public. Despite having a firewall, you
need to keep applications and daemons on your system properly
configured and up to date. A firewall is not a cure all, but should
be an essential part of your overall security strategy.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2>
<title>Meaning of the Word "Firewall"</title>
<para>The word firewall can have several different meanings.</para>
<sect3>
<title><xref linkend="fw-persFw"/></title>
<para>This is a hardware device or software program commercially sold (or
offered via freeware) by companies such as Symantec which claims that
it secures a home or desktop computer connected to the Internet. This
type of firewall is highly relevant for users who do not know how their
computers might be accessed via the Internet or how to disable
that access, especially if they are always online and connected
via broadband links.</para>
</sect3>
<sect3>
<title><xref linkend="fw-masqRouter"/></title>
<para>This is a system placed between the Internet and an intranet.
To minimize the risk of compromising the firewall itself, it should
generally have only one role&mdash;that of protecting the intranet.
Although not completely risk free, the tasks of doing the routing and
IP masquerading (rewriting IP headers of the packets it routes from
clients with private IP addresses onto the Internet so that they seem
to come from the firewall itself) are commonly considered relatively
secure.</para>
</sect3>
<sect3>
<title><xref linkend="fw-busybox"/></title>
<para>This is often an old computer you may have retired and nearly
forgotten, performing masquerading or routing functions, but offering
non-firewall services such as a web-cache or mail. This may be used
for home networks, but is not to be considered as secure as a firewall
only machine because the combination of server and router/firewall on
one machine raises the complexity of the setup.</para>
</sect3>
<sect3>
<title>Firewall with a Demilitarized Zone [Not Further
Described Here]</title>
<para>This box performs masquerading or routing, but grants public
access to some branch of your network which, because of public IPs
and a physically separated structure, is essentially a separate
network with direct Internet access. The servers on this network are
those which must be easily accessible from both the Internet and
intranet. The firewall protects both networks. This type of firewall
has a minimum of three network interfaces.</para>
</sect3>
<sect3>
<title>Packetfilter</title>
<para>This type of firewall does routing or masquerading, but does
not maintain a state table of ongoing communication streams. It is
fast, but quite limited in its ability to block undesired packets
without blocking desired packets.</para>
</sect3>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="fw-writing" xreflabel="writing the firewalling-setup-scripts">
<title>Now You Can Start to Build your Firewall</title>
<caution>
<para>This introduction on how to setup a firewall is not a
complete guide to securing systems. Firewalling is a complex
issue that requires careful configuration. The scripts quoted
here are simply intended to give examples of how a firewall
works. They are not intended to fit into any particular
configuration and may not provide complete protection from
an attack.</para>
<para>Customization of these scripts for your specific situation
will be necessary for an optimal configuration, but you should
make a serious study of the iptables documentation and creating
firewalls in general before hacking away. Have a look at the
list of <xref linkend="fw-library"/> at the end of this section for
more details. There you will find a list of URLs that contain quite
comprehensive information about building your own firewall.</para>
</caution>
<para>The firewall configuration script installed in the iptables section
differs from the standard configuration script. It only has two of
the standard targets: start and status. The other targets are clear
and lock. For instance if you issue:</para>
<screen role="root"><userinput>/etc/rc.d/init.d/iptables start</userinput></screen>
<para>the firewall will be restarted just as it is upon system startup.
The status target will present a list of all currently implemented
rules. The clear target turns off all firewall rules and the lock
target will block all packets in and out of the computer with the
exception of the loopback interface.</para>
<para>The main startup firewall is located in the file
<filename>/etc/rc.d/rc.iptables</filename>. The sections below provide
three different approaches that can be used for a system.</para>
<note>
<para>You should always run your firewall rules from a script.
This ensures consistency and a record of what was done. It also
allows retention of comments that are essential for understanding
the rules long after they were written.</para>
</note>
<sect3 id="fw-persFw" xreflabel="Personal Firewall">
<title>Personal Firewall</title>
<para>A Personal Firewall is designed to let you access all the
services offered on the Internet, but keep your box secure and
your data private.</para>
<para>Below is a slightly modified version of Rusty Russell's
recommendation from the <ulink
url="http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO/packet-filtering-HOWTO.html">
Linux 2.4 Packet Filtering HOWTO</ulink>. It is still applicable
to the Linux 2.6 kernels.</para>
<screen role="root"><?dbfo keep-together="auto"?><userinput>cat &gt; /etc/rc.d/rc.iptables &lt;&lt; "EOF"
<literal>#!/bin/sh
# Begin rc.iptables
# Insert connection-tracking modules
# (not needed if built into the kernel)
modprobe nf_conntrack
modprobe xt_LOG
# Enable broadcast echo Protection
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
# Disable Source Routed Packets
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_source_route
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/accept_source_route
# Enable TCP SYN Cookie Protection
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies
# Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/accept_redirects
# Do not send Redirect Messages
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/send_redirects
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/send_redirects
# Drop Spoofed Packets coming in on an interface, where responses
# would result in the reply going out a different interface.
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/rp_filter
# Log packets with impossible addresses.
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/log_martians
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/log_martians
# be verbose on dynamic ip-addresses (not needed in case of static IP)
echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr
# disable Explicit Congestion Notification
# too many routers are still ignorant
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_ecn
# Set a known state
iptables -P INPUT DROP
iptables -P FORWARD DROP
iptables -P OUTPUT DROP
# These lines are here in case rules are already in place and the
# script is ever rerun on the fly. We want to remove all rules and
# pre-existing user defined chains before we implement new rules.
iptables -F
iptables -X
iptables -Z
iptables -t nat -F
# Allow local-only connections
iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
# Free output on any interface to any ip for any service
# (equal to -P ACCEPT)
iptables -A OUTPUT -j ACCEPT
# Permit answers on already established connections
# and permit new connections related to established ones
# (e.g. port mode ftp)
iptables -A INPUT -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
# Log everything else. What's Windows' latest exploitable vulnerability?
iptables -A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:INPUT "
# End $rc_base/rc.iptables</literal>
EOF
chmod 700 /etc/rc.d/rc.iptables</userinput></screen>
<para>This script is quite simple, it drops all traffic coming
into your computer that wasn't initiated from your computer, but
as long as you are simply surfing the Internet you are unlikely
to exceed its limits.</para>
<para>If you frequently encounter certain delays at accessing
FTP servers, take a look at <xref linkend="fw-BB-4"/>.</para>
<para>Even if you have daemons or services running on your system,
these will be inaccessible everywhere but from your computer itself.
If you want to allow access to services on your machine, such as
<command>ssh</command> or <command>ping</command>, take a look at
<xref linkend="fw-busybox"/>.</para>
</sect3>
<sect3 id="fw-masqRouter" xreflabel="Masquerading Router">
<title>Masquerading Router</title>
<para>A true Firewall has two interfaces, one connected to an
intranet, in this example <emphasis role="strong">eth0</emphasis>,
and one connected to the Internet, here <emphasis
role="strong">ppp0</emphasis>. To provide the maximum security
for the firewall itself, make sure that there are no unnecessary
servers running on it such as <application>X11</application> et
al. As a general principle, the firewall itself should not access
any untrusted service (think of a remote server giving answers that
makes a daemon on your system crash, or even worse, that implements
a worm via a buffer-overflow).</para>
<screen role="root"><?dbfo keep-together="auto"?><userinput>cat &gt; /etc/rc.d/rc.iptables &lt;&lt; "EOF"
<literal>#!/bin/sh
# Begin rc.iptables
echo
echo "You're using the example configuration for a setup of a firewall"
echo "from Beyond Linux From Scratch."
echo "This example is far from being complete, it is only meant"
echo "to be a reference."
echo "Firewall security is a complex issue, that exceeds the scope"
echo "of the configuration rules below."
echo "You can find additional information"
echo "about firewalls in Chapter 4 of the BLFS book."
echo "http://www.&lfs-domainname;/blfs"
echo
# Insert iptables modules (not needed if built into the kernel).
modprobe nf_conntrack
modprobe nf_conntrack_ftp
modprobe xt_conntrack
modprobe xt_LOG
modprobe xt_state
# Enable broadcast echo Protection
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
# Disable Source Routed Packets
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_source_route
# Enable TCP SYN Cookie Protection
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_syncookies
# Disable ICMP Redirect Acceptance
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/accept_redirects
# Don't send Redirect Messages
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/send_redirects
# Drop Spoofed Packets coming in on an interface where responses
# would result in the reply going out a different interface.
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/default/rp_filter
# Log packets with impossible addresses.
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/log_martians
# Be verbose on dynamic ip-addresses (not needed in case of static IP)
echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr
# Disable Explicit Congestion Notification
# Too many routers are still ignorant
echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_ecn
# Set a known state
iptables -P INPUT DROP
iptables -P FORWARD DROP
iptables -P OUTPUT DROP
# These lines are here in case rules are already in place and the
# script is ever rerun on the fly. We want to remove all rules and
# pre-existing user defined chains before we implement new rules.
iptables -F
iptables -X
iptables -Z
iptables -t nat -F
# Allow local connections
iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT
# Allow forwarding if the initiated on the intranet
iptables -A FORWARD -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -i ! ppp+ -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j ACCEPT
# Do masquerading
# (not needed if intranet is not using private ip-addresses)
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o ppp+ -j MASQUERADE
# Log everything for debugging
# (last of all rules, but before policy rules)
iptables -A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:INPUT "
iptables -A FORWARD -j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:FORWARD "
iptables -A OUTPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:OUTPUT "
# Enable IP Forwarding
echo 1 &gt; /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward</literal>
EOF
chmod 700 /etc/rc.d/rc.iptables</userinput></screen>
<para>With this script your intranet should be reasonably secure
against external attacks. No one should be able to setup a new
connection to any internal service and, if it's masqueraded,
makes your intranet invisible to the Internet. Furthermore, your
firewall should be relatively safe because there are no services
running that a cracker could attack.</para>
<note>
<para>If the interface you're connecting to the Internet
doesn't connect via PPP, you will need to change
<replaceable>&lt;ppp+&gt;</replaceable> to the name of the interface
(e.g., <emphasis role="strong">eth1</emphasis>) which you are
using.</para>
</note>
</sect3>
<sect3 id="fw-busybox" xreflabel="BusyBox">
<title>BusyBox</title>
<para>This scenario isn't too different from the <xref
linkend="fw-masqRouter"/>, but additionally offers some
services to your intranet. Examples of this can be when
you want to administer your firewall from another host on
your intranet or use it as a proxy or a name server.</para>
<note>
<para>Outlining a true concept of how to protect a server that
offers services on the Internet goes far beyond the scope of
this document. See the references at the end of this section
for more information.</para>
</note>
<para>Be cautious. Every service you have enabled makes your
setup more complex and your firewall less secure. You are
exposed to the risks of misconfigured services or running
a service with an exploitable bug. A firewall should generally
not run any extra services. See the introduction to the
<xref linkend="fw-masqRouter"/> for some more details.</para>
<para>If you want to add services such as internal Samba or
name servers that do not need to access the Internet themselves,
the additional statements are quite simple and should still be
acceptable from a security standpoint. Just add the following lines
into the script <emphasis>before</emphasis> the logging rules.</para>
<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT -i ! ppp+ -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -o ! ppp+ -j ACCEPT</literal></screen>
<para>If daemons, such as squid, have to access the Internet
themselves, you could open OUTPUT generally and restrict
INPUT.</para>
<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -j ACCEPT</literal></screen>
<para>However, it is generally not advisable to leave OUTPUT
unrestricted. You lose any control over trojans who would like
to "call home", and a bit of redundancy in case you've
(mis-)configured a service so that it broadcasts its existence
to the world.</para>
<para>To accomplish this, you should restrict INPUT and OUTPUT
on all ports except those that it's absolutely necessary to have
open. Which ports you have to open depends on your needs: mostly
you will find them by looking for failed accesses in your log
files.</para>
<itemizedlist spacing="compact" role='iptables'>
<title>Have a Look at the Following Examples:</title>
<listitem>
<para>Squid is caching the web:</para>
<screen><literal>iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --sport 80 -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED \
-j ACCEPT</literal></screen>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Your caching name server (e.g., named) does its
lookups via UDP:</para>
<screen><literal>iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT</literal></screen>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>You want to be able to ping your computer to
ensure it's still alive:</para>
<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type echo-reply -j ACCEPT</literal></screen>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para id='fw-BB-4' xreflabel="BusyBox example number 4">If
you are frequently accessing FTP servers or enjoy chatting, you might
notice certain delays because some implementations of these daemons
have the feature of querying an identd on your system to obtain
usernames. Although there's really little harm in this, having an
identd running is not recommended because many security experts feel
the service gives out too much additional information.</para>
<para>To avoid these delays you could reject the requests
with a 'tcp-reset':</para>
<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 113 -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset</literal></screen>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>To log and drop invalid packets (packets
that came in after netfilter's timeout or some types of
network scans) insert these rules at the top of the chain:</para>
<screen><literal>iptables -I INPUT 0 -p tcp -m conntrack --ctstate INVALID \
-j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:INVALID "
iptables -I INPUT 1 -p tcp -m conntrack --ctstate INVALID -j DROP</literal></screen>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Anything coming from the outside should not have a
private address, this is a common attack called IP-spoofing:</para>
<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT -i ppp+ -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -i ppp+ -s 172.16.0.0/12 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -i ppp+ -s 192.168.0.0/16 -j DROP</literal></screen>
<para>There are other addresses that you may also want to
drop: 0.0.0.0/8, 127.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/3 (multicast and
experimental), 169.254.0.0/16 (Link Local Networks), and
192.0.2.0/24 (IANA defined test network).</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>If your firewall is a DHCP client, you need to allow
those packets:</para>
<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT -i ppp0 -p udp -s 0.0.0.0 --sport 67 \
-d 255.255.255.255 --dport 68 -j ACCEPT</literal></screen>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>To simplify debugging and be fair to anyone who'd like
to access a service you have disabled, purposely or by mistake,
you could REJECT those packets that are dropped.</para>
<para>Obviously this must be done directly after logging as the very
last lines before the packets are dropped by policy:</para>
<screen><literal>iptables -A INPUT -j REJECT</literal></screen>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
<para>These are only examples to show you some of the capabilities
of the firewall code in Linux. Have a look at the man page of iptables.
There you will find much more information. The port numbers needed for
this can be found in <filename>/etc/services</filename>, in case you
didn't find them by trial and error in your log file.</para>
</sect3>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="fw-finale" xreflabel="Conclusion">
<title>Conclusion</title>
<para>Finally, there is one fact you must not forget: The effort spent
attacking a system corresponds to the value the cracker expects to gain
from it. If you are responsible for valuable information, you need to
spend the time to protect it properly.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="postlfs-security-fw-extra" xreflabel="Extra Information">
<title>Extra Information</title>
<sect3 id="fw-library" xreflabel="links for further reading">
<title>Where to Start with Further Reading on Firewalls</title>
<blockquote>
<literallayout>
<ulink url="http://www.netfilter.org/">www.netfilter.org - Homepage of the netfilter/iptables project</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/FAQ/netfilter-faq.html">Netfilter related FAQ</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/index.html#HOWTO">Netfilter related HOWTO's</ulink>
<ulink url="http://en.tldp.org/LDP/nag2/x-087-2-firewall.html">en.tldp.org/LDP/nag2/x-087-2-firewall.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://en.tldp.org/HOWTO/Security-HOWTO.html">en.tldp.org/HOWTO/Security-HOWTO.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://en.tldp.org/HOWTO/Firewall-HOWTO.html">en.tldp.org/HOWTO/Firewall-HOWTO.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.linuxsecurity.com/docs/">www.linuxsecurity.com/docs/</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.little-idiot.de/firewall">www.little-idiot.de/firewall (German &amp; outdated, but very comprehensive)</ulink>
<ulink url="http://linux.oreillynet.com/pub/a/linux/2000/03/10/netadmin/ddos.html">linux.oreillynet.com/pub/a/linux/2000/03/10/netadmin/ddos.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos">staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/ddos</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.e-infomax.com/ipmasq">www.e-infomax.com/ipmasq</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.circlemud.org/~jelson/writings/security/index.htm">www.circlemud.org/~jelson/writings/security/index.htm</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.securityfocus.com">www.securityfocus.com</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/">www.cert.org - tech_tips</ulink>
<ulink url="http://security.ittoolbox.com/">security.ittoolbox.com</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.insecure.org/reading.html">www.insecure.org/reading.html</ulink>
</literallayout>
</blockquote>
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moved out of the section so the literallayout won't produce blank
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<ulink url="http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/security/library/s-fire.html">www.ibm.com/developerworks/security/library/s-fire.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/security/library/s-fire2.html">www.ibm.com/developerworks/security/library/s-fire2.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.interhack.net/pubs/fw-faq/">www.interhack.net/pubs/fw-faq/</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.linuxgazette.com/issue65/stumpel.html">www.linuxgazette.com/issue65/stumpel.html</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.linux-firewall-tools.com/linux/">www.linux-firewall-tools.com/linux/</ulink>
<ulink url="http://logi.cc/linux/athome-firewall.php3">logi.cc/linux/athome-firewall.php3</ulink>
<ulink url="http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/firewall-seen.html">www.robertgraham.com/pubs/firewall-seen.html</ulink>
-->
</sect3>
</sect2>
</sect1>